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A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter
ourselves. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, "the press has fought to establish an absolute
constitutional right to keep confidential sources secret."2 Recently,
though, reporters and editors have not only willingly revealed their
confidential sources, but have sought constitutional protection for
doing so.3 This trend prompted one commentator to note that, "a
pledge of confidentiality to a source should be neither sought nor
granted lightly, for it can encourage irresponsibility and can deprive the news-consuming public of significant, truthful informal. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1987)
(denied defendant's summary judgment motion) [hereinafter Cohen 1], 15 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2288 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1988) (denied motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial) [hereinafter Cohen II], aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445 N.W. 2d 248
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Cohen III], afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 457 N.W. 2d
199 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Cohen IV], cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) [hereinafter
Cohen V], rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) [hereinafter Cohen VI]. Quoted from
Cohen III, 445 N.W. 2d at 268 (Crippen, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part).
2. Comment, Reporter Privilege: Shield or Sword? Applying a Modified Breach of
Contract Standard When a Newsperson "Burns" a Confidential Source, 42 FED. COMM.
L.J. 277, 316 (1990) [hereinafter Fed. Comm. Comment].
3. See generally Cohen I, II, III, IVV, VI. See also Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 1991 WL 195046
(3d Cir. 1991); Doe v. American Broadcasting Companies, 549 N.E. 2d 480 (1989).

Published by Institutional Repository, 1993

1

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 10
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:239

tion."' Upon this backdrop, members of the press have urged
courts to include First Amendment protections when adjudicating
the asserted breach of a confidentiality promise to a news source.
This Note will explore the legal implications of a breach of
confidentiality by examining Cohen v. Cowles Media. After
presenting the substantive and procedural facts that eventually
brought Cohen before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court's decision itself will be scrutinized. This Note will then present the five
most common methods of analyzing the press' breach of confidentiality to an anonymous source, discuss their pros and cons, and
propose an alternative methodology better suited to the analysis of
future breaches. The proposed methodology is similar to the promissory estoppel analysis applied by the majority of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Cohen,6 but includes modifications protective of
both First Amendment interests and the position of the confidential source. 7 This methodology requires courts to make a threshold
determination of both the existence of the promise and a determination of whether or not it was broken, and then to balance the
interests of the state in enforcing the promise under state promissory estoppel law against the interests of the free press and the
protections afforded them under the First Amendment.
II. FROM AN UNKEPT PROMISE To THE

SUPREME COURT

On October 27, 1982, Dan Cohen, a public relations director
for a Minnesota advertising agency and supporter of Republican
gubernatorial candidate Weelock Whitney,8 approached several
journalists9 with potentially damaging information about Marlene
Johnson, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor candidate for Lieutenant
Governor."° In two private discussions - one with reporter Lori
Sturdevant of the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the other with
reporter Bill Salisbury of the St. Paul Pioneer Press - Cohen allegedly stated:
I have some documents which may or may not relate to a candi4. Fed. Comm. Comment at 283.
5. See supra note 1.
6. See infra notes 245-286 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 257-286 and accompanying text.
8. Brief for Respondents Northwest Publications, Inc. at 2-3, Cohen V, cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 578 (1990) (No. 90-634) [hereinafter Respondents Brief]. See also Cohen IV at
201 (Cohen planned to bill the campaign for time he spent working in this capacity).
9. Respondents Brief at 4 (Cohen also met with reporters from the Associated Press
and WCCO-TV.).
10. Id. at 2 (The Republicans were trailing the Democrats by 18 points.)
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date in the upcoming election, and if you will give me a promise
of confidentiality, that is that I will be treated as an anonymous
source, that my name will not appear in any material in connection with this, and you will also agree that you're not going to
pursue with me a question of who my source is, then I'll furnish
you with the documents. 1

Sturdevant and Salisbury apparently agreed,12 and Cohen provided
them with copies of court records revealing that Marlene Johnson
had been charged with three counts of unlawful assembly in 1969
and convicted of one count of petit larceny in 1970.13
On the same day that this information was received, each paper contacted Marlene Johnson for her reaction.14 Additionally,
the Star Tribune conducted its own investigation revealing that
the last person to request the court records regarding Johnson was
employed by Dan Cohen.15 Thereafter, over the objections of the
reporters16 , the editorial staffs of each newspaper independently
decided to break the promise of confidentiality and published Cohen's name with the story. 1 7 Each newspaper then printed seperate
articles that "included claims by the Democratic camp that the
news had been leaked by the Republican campaign as a 'last-minute smear campaign.' "18 Cohen was subsequently fired from his
19
job.
Cohen brought an action in Minnesota District Court against
the Star Tribune and the PioneerPress alleging breach of contract
and fraud.2" Reasoning that in this case, the First Amendment
functions as an absolute bar to liability, 2 1 the newspapers re11. Id. See also Brief for Petitioner Dan Cohen at 3, Cohen V, cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 578 (1990) (No 90-634) [hereinafter PetitionersBrief].
12. Neither one of the reporters informed Cohen that their decisions could be later
overruled by each of their editors, and each reporter agreed without reviewing the actual
information. Cohen IV at 200. See also Respondents Brief at 5.
13. The charges for unlawful assembly for protesting against discriminatory hiring
practices were dismissed. Additionally, the petit larceny conviction for the theft of $6 in
sewing materials committed when she was "upset and disoriented by her father's recent
death," and was vacated a year later. Respondents Brief at 5.
14. Cohen IV at 200.
15. Respondents Brief at 3.
16. Respondents Brief at 3. The editorial staffs of each newspaper decided that it
would be inappropriate to conceal the indentity of the source of the news and ran stories
indentifying Cohen.
17. Respondents Brief at 2-3. See also Cohen IV at 201.
18. Id.
19. Id."
20. Id.
21. Id. at 11. See generally Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609 (1991) [hereinafter Levi]; Fed.
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quested that summary judgment be granted in their favor. The
trial court rejected this contention, refusing to recognize a constitutional issue.22 After a trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict for Cohen on both the fraud and breach of contract claims and
awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in
punitive damages.2 3 Both newspapers appealed.2 4
The Minnesota Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
breach of contract verdict as well as the compensatory damages
award, but reversed the fraud verdict and the punitive damages
award.25 The court found that since the reporters originally had
the intention of performing their contracts with Cohen, they could
not have committed misrepresentations.2 6 Thus, a finding of fraud
could not be supported.
A divided court,2 7 however, affirmed the breach of contract
and compensatory damages award. 28 The majority found that both
newspapers entered into confidentiality contracts, Cohen's lawsuit
did not constitute state action that would "trigger first amendment
scrutiny,"2 9 his interest in enforcing his rights under contract outweighed any First Amendment defense that the newspapers could
assert, 30 and the reporters' confidentiality promises acted as a
waiver of any First Amendment right that they may have possessed.3 1 The dissent reasoned that the judicial enforcement of a
Comm. Comment; Note, Labunski, When a Promise Is Not a Promise: The Legal Consequences for Journalists Who Break Promises of Confidentiality to Sources, 12 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 565 (1990) [hereinafter Labunski].
22. Respondents Brief at 11. Thus, the court refused to find that the First Amendment acted as either a complete or partial barrier to Cohen's contractual claims.
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Cohen III at 259, 260. This finding resulted from the lack of evidence that the
reporters who promissed Cohen confidentiality knew that their editors could override these
promises pursuant to their newspapers' policies.
27. The court was divided by a vote of two to one. Id. at 251.
28. Id. at 252 (The major issues that the court considered were whether the First
Amendment barred Cohen's contract action given that the reporters' disclosure was "truthful and newsworthy," and whether Cohen's misrepresentation action was properly denied at
the appelate level.).
29. Id. at 254.
30. Id. at 256 ("The governmental interest in allowing the civil damage award in the
instant case [was claimed to] outweigh the intrusion on press freedom.").
31. Id. at 258. The waiver argument was central to the analysis of the majority. First,
the court established that in order for the press to waive its First Amendment protections, it
must be done "in clear and compelling circumstances." Relying on Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania, 853 F. 2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988), the court found
that the press can only waive their First Amendment protections if" 'the facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver make it clear that the party foregoing its rights has done so

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/10

4

Petruzzi: <em>Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.</em>: Burning Sources and Burning Q
COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA CO.
19931

monetary judgment against the newspapers constituted state action and that an adverse judgment against them both "usurped
editiorial decisionmaking" and chilled the free press.2 Also, the

dissent concluded that the promises the reporters made to Cohen
did not constitute valid contracts33 and did not satisfy the "stringent conditions" necessary to waive First Amendment
guarantees.3 4
Granting both Cohen and the newspapers their petitions for
further review, the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to hear the
appeal.3 5 The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals
decision, holding that under Minnesota law, the Pioneer Press and
the Star Tribune should prevail on the fraud claim.36 However, in
of its own volition, with full understanding of the consequences of its waiver.'" Specifically,
the court decided that in Cohen, the "seasoned reporters" who gave Cohen their pledge of
confidentiality knowing he was a "prominent Independent Republican" involved in the gubernatorial election campaign "understood that they were waiving the right to publish a
potentially newsworthy item [Cohen's identity] in return for obtaining another potentially
newsworthy item." Finally, the court characterized the waiver as "part of a negotiated
agreement between experienced reporters and an experienced political operative." Cohen III
at 258.
32. Cohen III at 263 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (Judge Crippen believed that the press,
"not the courts," should "decide when promises on content should be made and ...
when
publication is important.").
33. Judge Crippen stressed that this case did not present "a regular contract claim."
Instead, he believed that it constituted "an agreement not to publish [and] a pledge not to
excercise press freedom." Id. at 263.
34. Id. at 266. The dissent believed the waiver argument was flawed. Claiming that the
majority's reliance on the language of Erie Telecommunications was "incomplete," the
Court stressed that, according to Erie, there could be "no such waiver absent 'clear and
compelling circumstances.' " Additionally, the dissent relied on Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1931) to stress that courts must " 'indulge even a reasonable presumption against waiver' of any fundamental constitutional right," and National Polymer
Products, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F. 2d 418, 424 (6th Cir. 1981) which found that
"[ilf
a waiver is identified, it 'must be narrowly construed to effectuate the policies of the
First Amendment.'" After applying this caselaw to the facts at issue in Cohen, the dissent
found that "[t]he circumstances . . . do not constitute, clearly and compellingly, a case
where first amendment freedom has been renounced" because Cohen "neither sought nor
obtained a deliberative pledge of anonymity by media editors," and that "[g]iven [the] publication of true facts on an important event of a political campaign, the clear and compelling
case . . . is for upholding press freedom." Lastly, after discovering "no precedent for a finding of waiver by agreement on the part of the press, and no more than mixed indications
regarding waiver by agreement for any political speech," the dissent found that under the
circumsances presented by Cohen, there was no waiver of First Amendment press protections. Cohen III at 266, 267, 268 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
35. Cohen IV at 200.
36. Id. at 200, 202 ("[Cohen] admits that the reporters intended to keep their
promises. . .. Moreover,. . . the editors had no intention to reveal [his] identity until later
when more information was recveived and the matter was discussed with other editors.
These facts do not support a fraud claim.")
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reversing the breach of contract award,"7 the court held that the
promise of confidentiality given to Cohen was not legally enforceable and did not constitute a binding contract.38 The court recognized that some promises of confidentiality are binding, but
stressed that contract law is "an ill fit for a promise of news source
confidentiality." 3' 9 Characterizing the relationship at issue in Cohen
as "an 'I'll-scratch-your-back-if-you'll-scratch-mine' accomodation,"40 the court decided that both Cohen and the two newspapers
had "assum[ed] the risks of what might happen, protected only by
' After determining that both the
the good faith of [each other]."41
breach of contract and fraud could not to be applied to the situation presented by this case, the court explored the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as a possible recourse for the breached
42
promises of confidentiality.
Interpreting Minnesota law, 43 the court made a two-fold determination that promissory estoppel will imply the existence of a legally enforceable contract even where no contract exists in fact,
but only if injustice would be avoided solely by its enforcement.4"
Having concluded that some type of a promise existed, the first
prong of the definition of promissory estoppel was satisfied. To
satisfy the second prong, the court examined each of the reasons as
to why the promise was broken. 45 This was done to determine
37.

Id. at 202 ("The law, however, does not create a contract where the parties in-

tended none.").
38. Id. at 203. See also Respondents Brief at 5 ([Sltate law does not "consider binding
every exchange of promises" and "[wie are not persuaded that in the special milieu of media
newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily believe they are engaged in making a legally binding contract.") This is largely because the court perceived situations where reporters and sources exchange promises of confidentiality for information as too informal to implicate the elements of a traditional contract.
39. Cohen IV at 203 ("To impose a contract theory on this arrangement puts an unwarranted legal rigidity on a special ethical relationship, precluding necessary consideration
of factors underlying that special ethical relationship.").
40. Id.
41. Id. Although the court did not explicitly state what risks these particular parties
assumed, it alluded to situations "where disclosure is required to correct misstatements
made by the source; and where failure to reveal the source may subject the newspaper to
substantial libel damages." Cohen IV at 202, n. 4. See generally Fed. Comm. Comment;
Lubanski; Langley and Levine at 22.
42. Cohen IV at 203. See also Respondents Brief at 15-16. Cf PetitionersBrief at 14.
43. Cohen IV at 202, 203. See also Respondents Brief at 15.
44. Id. at 14. The issue had not been presented to the jury, nor briefed by the parties,
but rather came about as a question asked by one of the judges during oral argument.
45. Cohen IV at 204 ("For example, was Cohen's name 'newsworthy'? Was publishing
it necessary for a fair and balanced story? Would identifying the source simply as being
close to the Whitney campaign have been enough?"). See also Cohen VI at 2517 (discussing
the Minnesota Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
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whether enforcing the promise would have avoided injustice."'
In doing so, the court relied on a First Amendment-sensitive
balancing test. 47 The court balanced First Amendment interests
against common law contract interests. On one side of the scale,
the court weighed the fact that the promise of confidentiality
"arose in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our democratic society. '48 On the opposite
side of the scale, the court weighed Cohen's common law contract
interest, noting "[tihe potentiality that [he] willingly entered [the
contract] albeit hoping to do so on his own terms."4' 9 After balancing these factors and emphasizing that its holding was narrow, the
court refused to find a legally enforceable promissory estoppel
remedy.50 The court did, however, leave open the possibility that
instances may exist "where a confidential source would be entitled
to a remedy such as promissory estoppel. '' 51 This, of course, would
depend upon which side of the balance is heavier - the First
Amendment, or state interests in enforcing promises of
confidentiality. 52
On December 10, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the First Amendment questions that Cohen
presented.5 3 In a 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the First
Amendment did not bar the recovery of damages "under state
promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of
46. Cohen IV at 204. See infra notes 210 - 220 and accompanying text.
47. See Cohen IV at 205 ("The court must balance the constitutional rights of a free
press against the common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity. In deciding
whether it would be unjust not to enforce the promise, the court must necessarily weigh the
same considerations that are weighed for whether the First Amendment has been violated."). This was in reference to the political nature of the news material (i.e. a political
activist working on behalf of one of the candidates in a hotly-contested election).
48. Id. This was in reference to the political nature of the revelation of Cohen's identity as well as an implicit reference to the context in which the disclosure of Cohen's identity was made.
49. Id. Thus, the Court gave support to the societal interest in maintaining ordered
commercial relationships.
50. Cohen IV at 205. See also Respondents Brief at 15.
51. Cohen IV at 205. For instance, in Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 939 F.
2d. at 598, a patient who had been sexualy abused by her therapist gave an interview to
Glamour Magazine on the condition that she not be made "identifiable." When the article
did, in fact, make her identifiable, she sued. Relying on Cohen, the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that promissory estoppel damages were available as a remedy and remanded
the case to the district court to determine the amount of damages, if any. See supra note 3.
52. Cohen IV at 204, 205. Although the Court did not specifically delineate what situation is required for common law interests in enforcing the promise to outweigh First
Amendment protections, it did imply that this would involve a fact specific determination at
the trial court level. Cf. Levi at 714.
53. Cohen VI at 2517.
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confidentiality given . . .in exchange for information."5
The preliminary question the majority considered was whether
or not to dismiss the case on the ground that the promissory estoppel cause of action was neither argued nor presented before the
Minnesota Supreme Court. 5 Finding that this issue did "not merit
extended discussion,"5 6 the Court decided it had jurisdiction to
hear the case, and stated that "[iut is irrelevant . . . whether a
that the state
party raised below and argued a federal-law issue
57
supreme court actually considered and decided.
The Court then examined what it deemed as the critical First
Amendment issue.5 8 Acknowledging the holding of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,59 the Court admitted that a private cause of
action for promissory estoppel constitutes "state action" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment" when First Amendment
freedoms are restricted. 1 Therefore, court enforcement of this
judgment against the newspapers was state action. After making
this determination, the Court addressed the newspapers' reliance
on the Smith v. Daily Mail 2 line of cases.6 3 At issue in Smith was
whether a West Virginia statute that criminally punished the press
54. Id. at 2516 (Justice White delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy; Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Souter; and Justice Souter filed a seperate dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor.).
55. Id. at 2517 (This was of minor jurisdictional concern, but it does illustrate the
manner in which the promissory estoppel argument came about. Its origin was a result of a
question posed by one of the judges of the Minnesota Supreme Court.) See also Cohen VI at
2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Cohen VI at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56. Cohen VI at 2517.
57. Id. (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 274-275 (1979); Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 754, n.2 (1985); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 362,
371, n. 3 (1988); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 161-162 (1978); Jenkins V. Georgia, 418
U:S. 153, 157 (1979)). The Court stated that this "could not be made more clear than by
[the court's] conclusion that 'in this case enforcement of the promise of confidentiality
under a promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First Amendment rights.'"
(citing Cohen IV at 205.).
58. Id. at 2517 (The Court asked "[w]hether that Amendment bars a promissory estoppel cause of action against respondents.").
59. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). at 713 (This "limit[ed] a
State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against [a
newspaper advertisement] critic[al] of his official conduct.").
60. Cohen VI at 2517. "[Tlhe application of state rules of law in state courts in a
manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the
Fourteenth Amendment [and] promissory estopel is a state-law doctrine which, in the absence of a contract, creates obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties." Id. at 2518.
61. Thus, this case seems to implicate First Amendment protections. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
63. Cohen VI at 2518.
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for the publication of the name of any juvenile offender, without
first obtaining the permission of the juvenile court, violated provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."' Emphasizing
that its holding was narrow, the Court found the statute to be in
violation of First Amendment press freedoms. The Smith Court
held that this sanction violated the First Amendment because the
state interest in safeguarding the juvenile's anonymity did not justify the imposition of a criminal punishment for the "truthful publication" of the newspaper's "lawfully obtained" information. 5 The
newspapers in Cohen contended that if the promissory estoppel
approach was used, state officials would also be "constitutionally
punishing" them for printing their "lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance . . . absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order.""6 However, the
Court determined that Cohen was not controlled by the Smith v.
Daily Mail line of cases. 7 Rather, the majority relied on what it
called "equally well-established" precedent that found laws of general applicability6 8 non-offensive to the First Amendment because
their application to the press has only "incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news." '
The Court equated the breach of confidentiality in Cohen with
instances in which newspapers and publishers were required to
abide by the application of a variety of disparate generally applicable laws."0 Thus, the Court covered Cohen with its rule that the
64. Smith, 443 U.S. at 98.
65. Id. at 97.
66. See Cohen VI at 2517. This is the test used by the Court in Smith. See also The
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978).
67. Cohen VI at 2517. This line of cases includes Smith, The Florida Star, and
Landmark Communications, each of which stand for the general principle that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order." Smith at 103.
68. State promisory estoppel statutes may be included under the rubric of generally
applicable laws. Thus, the majority was able to completly avoid having to construct a test
that would be sensitive to First Amendment protections.
69. Id. at 2518 (emphasis added). The Court's characterization of the effects on the
media as "incidental" indicates that it had made a pre-determination of the effect that it
would have. In other words, by characterizing these often harsh effects as "incidental," the
Court, by implication, forclosed the possibility that newspapers would have a higher level of
protection.
70. Cohen VI at 2517-18 ("Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The press, like
others interested in publishing, may not publish copyrighted material without obeying the
copyright laws . . . . Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, (1977).
Similarly, the media must obey the National Labor Relations Act, Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
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press does not have any special immunity from the application of
laws of general applicability. 71 The Court intended this to mean
that the media has "no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others. '72 Applying this to Cohen, they pointed out
that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability and, as such, covers "the daily transactions of all
the citizens of Minnesota," including the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press.7 s Therefore, the Court was able to shoehorn Cohen
into its category of cases which hold that generally applicable laws
are not controlled by the First Amendment. The majority concluded that, in this case, "[t]he First Amendment does not forbid
[the doctrine's] application to the press"7 4 because the "enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against
75
other persons or organizations. '
The majority dismissed the notion that imposing the doctrine
of promissory estoppel and awarding damages would in some way
"penalize" the media for disseminating truthful information.76 Not
considering compensatory damages to be a type of penalty, 77 the
Court examined the newspapers' reliance on Smith v. Daily Mail.78
Walling, 327 U. S. 186.").
71. See id.
72. Id. at 2518 ("Accordingly, enforcement of such general laws against the press is
not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons
or organizations.") (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 132-133.).
73. Id. at 2517-18.
74. Id. at 2518. Cf. Levi; Labunski; Fed. Comm. Comment.
75. Cohen VI at 2519. Again, it should be noted that First Amendment press freedoms
are not limited to the traditional press. It is possible that quite a few "other persons or
organizations" may suffer the same consequenses as the newspapers in this case. Thus, the
Court misses the point that these "other persons or organizations" may also grant a promise
of confidentiality to a source, and then reveal the source's identity. For example, if a writer
for a labor union newsletter granted a promise of confidentiality to a high-ranking, corrupt
union representative, would the newsletter be liable for a breach of the promise?
76. Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is based on the notion that truthful
information regarding a political campaign does not violate the First Amendment. In Cohen,
this penalty would come in the form of damages. The purely economic nature of the penalty
does not make it any less of a punishment. See also Cohen IV at 205.
77. Id. at 2519. This notion has not been afforded much weight by other commentators and courts. If to punish is to deter, and compensatory damages can be said to have a
deterring effect on the media's decision to print other relevant stories that may be in violation of confidences already given, then it seems to be a form of punishment. In this situation, punishment is not merely an incidental effect of the award of damages, it is the principal effect on the newspapers resulting from the award of damages. See also Cohen IV at
205.
78. Cohen VI at 2519. See supra note 63.
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"[R]ather than a [criminal] punishment imposed by the state, '79
the majority equated compensatory damages with a "liquidated
damages provision" of contract law, stating that the payment of
these damages are simply an additional cost of "acquiring newsworthy material to be published at a profit."8 0 Finding the payment of compensatory damages to be "constitutionally indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a confidential news
source," the Court further distinguished Cohen from the Smith
line of cases.
The Court then looked to the press' reliance on the contentsensitive second prong of the test in Smith v. The Daily Mail and
The Florida Star v. B.J.F. The Court distinguished these cases by
pointing out that the "content" of both of these publications that
could have resulted in liability was defined by the state where, in
Cohen, "Minnesota law simply requires those making promises to
keep them."8' 2 The majority also distinguished the Smith line of
cases by stressing that the newspapers in Cohen may not have
even "lawfully obtained"8 3 Dan Cohen's name for the purpose of
84
publishing it.
Lastly, the Court addressed the argument that granting the
promissory estoppel claim will "chill" truthful reporting "because
news organizations will have legal incentives not to disclose a confidential source's identity even when that person's identity is itself
79. This is a reference to the type of punishment imposed by the state in Smith. See
Smith, 443 U.S. at 97.
80. Cohen VI at 2519. The Court seems to imply that this type of arrangement is no
different from "tabloid" newspapers that simply pay large sums of cash to "sources" for
stories to print. See also Cohen IV at 203 ("[Al payment of money which taints the integrity of the newsgathering function, such as money paid a reporter for the publishing of a
news story, is forbidden by the ethics of journalism.").
81. Cohen VI at 2519 (Regardless of this characterization, the Court implied that even
if the compensatory damages were a form of punishment, it would "[make] no difference for
First Amendment purposes when the law being applied is a general law and does not single
out the press.").
82. Id. Here, "Itihe parties themselves ... determine the scope of their legal obligations and any restrictions which may be placed on the publication of truthful information
are self-imposed.").
83. Smith, 443 U.S. at 97.
84. Id. ("Unlike the situation in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., where the rape victim's
name was obtained through lawful access to a police report, respondents obtained Cohen's
name only by making a promise which they did not honor."). However, this distinction does
not hold up under careful scrutiny. While breaking a promise of this nature may border on
the unethical, it does not rise to the level of being unlawful. Thus, if the Court was resting
its distinction on whether the newspapers lawfully obtained Cohen's name, and no finding
was made by any court, based on any evidence, that they did not, this distinction is
misplaced.
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newsworthy.""5 They dismissed this altogether by stating that "it
is no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant,
consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law
that requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep
them."86
In the first of two dissents, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, advocated the application of Smith v.
Daily Mail.8 7 They asserted that "the judicial enforcement of...
a promissory estoppel claim constitutes state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment [and] that the use of that claim to penalize the reporting of truthful information regarding a political campaign [would] violate the First Amendment."8 8
The dissent disagreed with the majority's contention that Cohen was controlled by the Branzburg line of cases.8 ' First, they did
not recognize the Minnestota Supreme Court's decision in Cohen
as creating "any exception to or immunity from" Minnesota law
for the press.90 In doing so, the dissent cited the lower court's application of New York Times v. Sullivan which held 'that a state
may not adopt a state rule of law to impose impermissible restrictions on the federal constitutional freedoms of speech and press."9 1
Thus, the dissent found that any First Amendment protections
given to the newspapers should also be applicable, and available, to
other persons or organizations that are not members of the press.2
The dissent also addressed the Court's reliance on the
Branzburg line of cases and the contention that the media is not
exempted from generally applicable laws.9 3 The dissenters emphasized the fact that Branzburg "did not involve the imposition of
85. Cohen VI at 2519.
86. Id. For this notion, the Court generally relied on the holding of Branzburg v.
Hayes, which found that the First Amendment does not protect the press from the force of
copyright laws.
87. Cohen VI at 2513, 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id. (The dissent disagreed "that generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.").
90. Id. ("[T]he Court's decision is premised, not on the identity of the speaker, but on
the speech itself. . . . It is of 'critical significance' that 'the promise of anonymity arises in
the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate in our democratic
society, namely, a political source involved in a political campaign.' ") (citing Cohen IV at
205).
91. Cohen IV at 205.
92. Cohen VI at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452 (1938)). See also supra note 75.
93. Cohen VI at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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' Making a contrary
liability based upon the content of speech."94
determination based on the content of the speech rather than the
effects of the speech, the dissent believed that Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell was "precisely on point." '
Hustler involved a suit between a nationally known public figure and a nationally distributed magazine for damages for libel
and intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of an ad
parody which appeared in the magazine and portrayed the public
figure as "having engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with
his mother in an outhouse.""6 In Hustler, the Court held that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited "public figures and
public officials [from] recover[ing] for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . without showing. . . that the publication contain[ed] a false statement of fact which was made with
actual malice," as defined by New York Times v. Sullivan.9 7 The
dissent pointed out that in Hustler, "[tlhere was no doubt that
Virginia's tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was 'a
law of general applicability' unrelated to the supression of
speech." 98 Nonetheless, since the law was used to restrict the freedom of expression, it became subject to the limitations imposed by
the requirements of the First Amendment."9 9 Furthermore, the
dissent attacked the majority's characterization of the "incidental
effect" that the state promissory estoppel statutes will have by reminding them that "the publication of important political speech
[was] the [only] claimed violation."' 0 0 As a result, the dissenters
contended that "as in Hustler, the law may not be enforced to
punish the expression of truthful information or opinion."''
94. Id. at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) ("In Branzburg, for example, this Court found it significant that 'these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or
assembly, no . . . restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied
command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. . . . [N]o penalty, civil or
criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue here.' ") (citing Branzburg
at 681; Associated Press v. NLRB, at 103, 133 (1937); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20, n.18 (1945); and Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139
(1969).).
95. Cohen VI at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)) (In Hustler, "the use of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to impose liability for the publication of a satirical critique violated the First
Amendment.").
96. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46.
97. Id. at 56.
98. Cohen VI at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 2521, 2522.
100. Id. at 2521 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Again, the dissenters stressed that "the imposition of civil liability based on
protected expression constitutes 'punishment' of speech for First Amendment purposes.
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Yet, this dissent did admit "that truthful speech may . . . be
sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, [as long as it is]
. . . in furtherance of a state interest 'of the highest order.' "102
Therefore, since the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the interest of the state was "far from compelling," the dissent weighted
the balance in favor of the newspapers.10 3
The second dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Souter
and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, concluded that Cohen did not fall within the line of cases controlled
by Branzburg because "commercial activities and relationships," as
opposed to the content of the publications, were central to the
holdings of those cases.104 These dissenters found that while generally applicable laws affecting the content of publications may satisfy constitutional requirements,'0 5 laws of general applicability
may often be equally as restrictive on First Amendment rights as
other laws specifically aimed at the speech itself. 06 Therefore, the
dissenting Justices found that they needed "to articulate, measure,
and compare the competing interests involved" before they could
decide whether the protections afforded by the Constitution should
be triggered. 0 7 Thus, these dissenters advocated the use of a balancing test.01
are no more justifiable as. 'a cost of aqifiring newsThough they be civil, the sanctions..
worthy material,' than were the libel damages at issue in New York Times, a permissible
cost of disseminating newsworthy material.").
102. Cohen VI at 2522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 443 U.S. at 103). Unfortunately, the dissenters do not define what a state interest of the highest order may
include.
103. See Cohen IV at 204-5. To determine if the interest of the state was compelling,
the lower court looked at whether the maintenance of ordered commercial relationships
would be upset by a First Amendment bar to recovery for breached promises of confidentiality. After finding that this promise did not constitute a contract in law, the court decided
that it would not.
104. Cohen VI at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (These dissenters were making referepce to Branzburg, Zacchini, Associated Press, and Oklahoma Press Publishing.). See
supra note 70.
105. Cohen VI at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (This is true only "'when [such effects]
have been justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to consitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved
S. .. Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections are asserted against the
excercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and that perforce
requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.' ") (citing Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
106. Cohen VI at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107. Id. In doing so, the dissent made reference to the weighing test of Hustler. See
also Petitioners Brief at 20.
108. Cohen VI at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting) (The dissent pointed out that this "has
been the Court's recent practice in publication cases.").
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Additionally, the dissent claimed a balancing test was appropriate "because the burden on publication is [not] in a sense 'selfimposed' by the newspaper's voluntary promise of confidentiality."1 9 Thus, in the balance, the dissenters considered the interest
that the public had in obtaining Cohen's name. In fact, the dissent
called this interest "integral to the balance that should be struck
in this case." 1 ' Deciding where this issue would balance, and
claiming "[t]here can be no doubt that the fact of Cohen's identity
expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced
by Minnesota voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial election,
the publication of which was thus of the sort quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection, the dissenters seemed to
favor the public interest."1 '1 1 In short, the dissenters found that the
interest of the state "in enforcing a newspaper's promise of confidentiality" was not enough to overcome the First Amendment "interest in [the] unfettered publication" of Cohen's identity." 2
109. Cohen VI at 2522, 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissenters claimed that to do
so would suggest both "the possibility of waiver" and "a conception of First Amendment
rights as those of the speaker alone, with a value that may be measured without reference to
the importance of the information to public discourse." As to the waiver issue, the dissenters relied on Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 to show that its requirements
were not met in Cohen. For an extended discussion of this issue, see supra note 32. As to
the furtherance of public discourse, the dissenters relied on CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,
395 (1981) and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) for the proposition that the public's right to know information is more important than the media's right to
disseminate it. Also, quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the dissenters warned that "[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of us and many
of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally." Cox, 420 U.S. at 492.
110. Cohen VI at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe First Amendment goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw. In this context, '[i]t is the right of the [public], not the right of the [media], which is paramount.' ")
(citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)). See supra note 7.
111. Cohen VI at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting) (As the dissent argued, the justification
for Cohen's disclosue to the press "could reflect on his character, which in turn could be
taken to reflect on the character of the candidate who had retained him."). It should be
noted that there are situations where the identity of the source may not be newsworthy. For
a brief discussion of one such situation, see supra note 51.
112. Cohen VI at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting) (However, the dissenters refused to find
that a breach of a promise of confidentiality of the sort implicated in Cohen could never be
remedied. In fact, they "conceive[d] of situations in which the injured party is a private
individual, whose identity is of less public concern than that of the petitioner; liability there
might not be constitutionally prohibited."). See supra notes 51, 110.
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BREACHED PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY: FIVE CURRENT
MODES OF ANALYSIS

Courts and commentators have struggled to seek a form of
analysis to apply to fact situations such as the one this Note examines. 1 3 This is best exemplified by the variety of approaches that
have been taken in deciding Cohen. Each decision, at every level,
from the trial court to the U. S. Supreme Court, has been at odds
with the decision(s) below - and no two opinions agree." 4 Much
disagreement exists regarding both the issues that are implicated
by this type of situation as well as the approach that should be
taken in the resolution of the issues that are implicated. The currently available material written on the type of confidentiality
breach at issue in Cohen suggests five different approaches. These
include: traditional contract analysis;" 5 strict First Amendment
analysis;"' modified contract / limited First Amendment analy-

sis;" 7 promissory estoppel analysis;" 8 and contextualist analysis." 9
Since each is unique - with its own benefits and detriments - they

will be discussed individually.
113. See generally, Comm. Ent. Note; Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73
MINN. L. REV. 1553 (1989) [hereinafter Minnesota Note]; Fed. Comm. Comment; Levi.
114. See generally, Cohen I, H, III, IV, VI.
115. See Fed. Comm. Comment; Comm. Ent. Note; Minnesota Note. Cf Levi at 644-5.
This approach focuses on the common law contract interests of the source promised confidentiality, and applies traditional contract law to remedy the breach of the promise. See
infra notes 120 - 146 and accompanying text.
116. See generally, Fed. Comm. Comment; Comm. Ent. Note; Minnesota Note. Cf.
Levi at 644-5. This approach views the First Amendment as a total barrier to civil suits
based on the breached promise of confidentiality. It is highly deferential to the press in that
it allows the unhampered publication of a source's identity. See infra notes 147 - 157 and
accompanying text.
117. See generally, Fed. Comm. Comment; Com. Ent. Note; Minnesota Note. Cf. Levi
at 644-5. This approach borrows from the defamation area in an effort to satisfy concerns
raised by the implication of First Amendment press protections. See infra notes 160 - 194
and accompanying text.
118. See generally, Fed. Comm. Comment; Comm. Ent. Note; Minnesota Note. Cf.
Levi at 644-5. This approach attempts to strike a balance between the strict First Amendment and traditional contract approaches. It relies on balancing the interests of state promissory estoppel law against First Amendment press protections. The basic difference between this approach and the modified contract approach rests on the*characterization of the
promise at issue as either a pure contract or a non-contractual agreement between the parties, that the court may turn into a contract if it meets promissory estoppel requirements.
See infra notes 196 - 219 and accompanying text.
119. See Levi. The contextualist approach seems to be the most difficult
t apply because it relies on no real test. It requires that the trier of fact focus on live "reality-based"
factors before deciding whether to allow recovery for the breached promise. Se infra notes
220 - 245 and accompanying text.
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A. Contract As Promise (of Confidentiality): The Traditional Contract Approach
Proponents of the traditional contract approach' 2" have addressed the breach of confidentiality between reporter and source
in terms of traditional contract law.' 2 ' A traditional contract analysis suggests the notion that an enforceable contract and all the elements that comprise it are usually present whenever a promise of
confidentiality is given in exchange for news that is published."'
The meeting or conversation that occurs between members of the
press and the source usually constitutes the offer and acceptance,
and the promise of confidentiality given to the source and the
newsworthy information given to the press is characterized as consideration. Thus, once it is determined that the confidentiality
agreement between the source and the reporter meets the requirements of a valid contract, failing to maintain the promised confidentiality will breach the "mutual agreement," and result in a
breach of contract.' 23 However, in order to succeed on such a claim,
the source must first show not only the existence of a contract, but
1 24
its breach as well.
Under traditional breach of contract analysis, "the focus [i]s
more on whether a binding promise was intended and breached,
not so much on the contents of that promise or the nature of the
information exchanged for the promise.'

6

Using a similar ap-

proach, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the "neutral
principles" inherent in contract law would not invoke the protections of the First Amendment and that the state interest in enforcing private contracts "outweighed any constitutional free press
120. See Fed. Comm. Comment at 29-30. See also Minnesota Note at 1567; Comm.
Ent. at 6-7; Levi at 645-48. These included the Cohen trial court, appellate court, Minnesota
Supreme Court Dissent, and the several commentators listed above.
121. See Fed. Comm. Comment at 308.
122. Minnesota Note at 1567 (This refers to the elements of offer, acceptance, and
valuable consideration.) (citing J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §16, 18 (2d rev. ed.
1974)). "A fourth element is implied; the parties must have intended legal consequences to
attach to their agreement, and courts use an objective test to determine whether the manifestations made by the parties would demonstrate the requisite intention to a reasonable
person." Id., n. 77. These elements are met in Cohen. As the majority of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals found, the materials that Cohen gave to the press and the promise of
confidentiality that the press gave to him, constituted "sufficient consideration" for a contract, and the meeting between Cohen and the reporters (where they "bargained" for the
information) constituted "offer and acceptance."
123. Comm. Ent. Note at 6.
124. See Minnesota Note at 1567 (footnotes omitted).
125. Cohen VI at 204.
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rights. 126
The advocates of a traditional contract approach to confidentiality agreements between reporters and their sources usually contend that its neutral application does not implicate the protections
of the First Amendment because it does not constitute state action.127 On a policy level, they claim that "court enforcement of
these agreements "promotes society's interest in achieving stable
relationships by allowing individuals to rely on others' promises
and by compensating parties when agreements are breached."12 8
However, a contract of this nature will be enforced only if the personal need for its enforcement clearly outweighs public policy. 129
While some courts and commentators agree with this approach, others have viewed its application as "inadequate" for the
type of situation in which Cohen and the two newspapers found
themselves.13 0 One commentator has even suggested a liberalization of traditional contract analysis by requiring courts to examine
five "complex" and "determinative" issues before deciding whether
to enforce the confidentiality promise.'3 1 Unfortunately, this complex set of factors results in a less than adequate, impractical, and
difficult application.
On a basic level, critics of this scheme maintain that when applying traditional breach of contract methodology to this situation,
a court is likely to be forced into imposing "absolute liability" on
the media for an "editorial decision" while disregarding the facts
that led to the breach in the first place.132 They perceive "the kind
of commercial activity that is typically the subject of contracts" to
be fundamentally different from "the gathering and reporting of
news."'3 3 This distinction is important because traditional contract
126. Id. at 204 (citing 45 N.W. 2d at 254-57.).
127. Levi at 645 (footnote omitted). See also Cohen VI at 2516, 2517.
128. Minnesota Note at 1574-75 (footnotes omitted). Advocates of a traditional contract approach also often indicate that the larger the interest of the source in protecting
their anonymity, the larger the damages award becomes once the confidentiality agreement
is breached.
129. See Comm. Ent. Note at 7.
130. Id.
131. Comm. Ent. Note at 7 (These include: "the parties expectations, forfeiture from
non-enforcement of the contract, the public interest in enforcing the contract, the strength
of the public policy and the possibility of furthering that policy."). This, however would
further complicate an already problematic and subjective balancing formula by including
and mandating the consideration of issues that are inherently subjective and difficult to
measure and balance.
132. Id. at 1578 (footnotes omitted).
133. Langley & Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 21 (July/Aug.
1988) at 24 (This is a difference that makes the law of contracts and the first amendment
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analysis has historically been applied to formal commercial contracts rather than arguably informal situations such as reportersource confidentiality promises which are often better characterized as something akin to a moral covenant. If this approach to the
breach of confidentiality agreements is used, public officials, who
are usually those persons promised confidentiality, would have the
power to call upon the courts to punish reporters who accurately
identified them as sources of published information." ' ' Thus, a
great amount of protection is provided for the source, while very
little protection is provided for the media.13 6 Even if it is the press
that volitionally promises confidentiality in the first place, this unequal distribution of protection between the press and the source
runs afoul of basic notions of fairness. Additionally, if this approach is combined with the waiver argument first articulated by
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the analytical balance will become tilted in favor of the source from the very beginning."3 '
It has also been noted that this approach will "chill" the media's editorial freedom in disseminating information that is newsworthy.13 7 Therefore, it has been argued that the traditional contract approach "is neither adequate in its denial of state action nor
faithful to the body of contract law which it purports to apply,"
and "it displays a marked hostility toward the press and its public
role." 3 8 The highly formalistic nature of this approach denies the
notion that confidentiality promises between sources and reporters
"are not contracts for the sale of goods or services. ' 139 Rather, a
promise of confidentiality is quite different from a typical commercial contract. To portray an arguably ethical or moral promise as
strange bedfellows.).
134. Id. at 24 (This illustrates that litigation can be "a powerful weapon with which to
punish reporters."). See also Cohen IV at 199, 200.
135. See Comm. Ent. Note at 7 ("For this reason, journalists rightly fear that sources
might intentionally relay false information and thereafter attempt to use anonymity as a
shield against responsibility.").
136. The notion that the press waives its First Amendment right to reveal the source's
identity by promising the source confidentiality in exchange for information effectively
reduces the entire calculus to a simple contract analysis by eliminating the discussion of
First Amendment protections. See supra note 35. See also Cohen III at 258. Cf. Cohen III
at 266, 267, 268 (Crippen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Cohen VI at 2522, 2523
(Souter, J., dissenting). Although this may prompt newspapers to candidly inform sources
that confidentiality is not absolute, believing that this result (regardless of its facial benefits) is an adequate justification for ignoring the First Amendment in a situation where the
First Amendment is clearly implicated seems absurd.
137. Minnesota Note at 1576.
138. Levi at 646 (footnotes omitted). See also Fed. Comm. Comment; Comm. Ent.
Note.
139. Levi at 648.
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such seems not only simplistic, but inaccurate. 14 0
Unlike typical commercial contracts, the press' grant of confidentiality seems to be far less volitional. Actually, most commentators agree that the press, rather than the source, occupies a
subordinate position at the time the actual promise of confidentiality is made."4 Also, as is exemplified by Cohen, the press may not
be aware of all the information necessary to volitionally grant confidentiality. For example, the identity of the informant may not
itself become newsworthy until the source's information is revealed
to the press - usually after the promise of confidentiality has been
given."" Moreover, even if the agreement was admittedly volitional, "not all voluntary promises are enforced as contracts without substantive inquiry into their social worth."'""
When analyzed under the traditional breach of contract approach, some commentators have characterized promises of confidentiality as "agreements for the suppression of speech," rather
than agreements for the dissemination of news.' 4 Thus, court enforcement of an agreement that results in limiting the protections
of First Amendment press freedoms implicates state action and
triggers First Amendment scrutiny. 146 Finally, as this approach asserts, even assuming that this situation does not implicate First
Amendment protections, "the freedom of contract approach represents a crude and inaccurate characterization of contract law"
when it is applied to reporter-source confidentiality promises. 146
140.

See Jack Colldeweih and Samuel Pleasants, Confidential Sources - The ReCOMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1991,
pp 14-19 [hereinafter, Colldeweih].
141. Often, the press is at the mercy of the source. Sources frequently not only dictate
the terms of the confidentiality agreement, but are generally in control of all aspects of the
reporter-source relationship, such as where the meetings take place (if at all), and when and
how information is exchanged, etc. Of course, the press has no constitutional right to receive
information. It only has a constitutional right to attempt to obtain newsworthy information.
See generally,New York Times, The FloridaStar, Smith v. Daily Mail. See also infra note
142.
142. See Cohen IV at 203 ("The source, for whatever reasons, wants certain information published. The reporter can only evaluate the information after receiving it, which is
after the promise is given; and the editor can only make a reasonable, informed judgement
after the information received is put in the larger context of the news.").
143. Levi at 648, 649 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 648. Professor Levi points out that in agreeing to maintain confidences, the
press, in essence, agrees to refrain from printing certain information (i.e. the source's identity). Thus, the press has agreed to suppress its own speech. See also Cohen III at 263
(Crippen, J., dissenting) (Judge Crippen viewed it as a "pledge not to excercise press
freedom.").
145. Id. See also supra note 52.
146. Id. (footnote omitted). This approach asserts that this is because "there are recognized instances in which 'the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some over-

porter's Privilege Muddle,
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B. Shield, Not Sword - The Strict First Amendment
Approach
This approach to the breach of reporter-source confidentiality
agreements views the First Amendment as a complete shield for
the press against all liability resulting from published information. 14 7 Proponents of this approach maintain that since the Supreme Court has historically granted editors the power to determine what stories to print, they should also have complete freedom
to publish the name of the source promised confidentiality. 48 They
point to other areas protected by First Amendment press freedoms
where "[i]nformation about an individual that is embarrassing,
causes extreme emotional distress, or is false and defamatory but
published without the requisite degree of fault," are protected by
the First Amendment. 4 9 In Cohen, the information given to the
press as well as the act of giving it "is a public and political matter" that the Court had viewed as being central to the protections
of the First Amendment. 5 Thus, it would seem that an argument
could be made supporting the view of the First Amendment as a
complete bar to suits for the breach of a promise of confidentiality.
However, the Supreme Court has never endorsed the existence
of an absolute press privilege to print all true information. 15
Rather, the Court has usually balanced First Amendment press interests against various common-law causes of action. 5 ' One comriding interest of society,' " and "even traditional contract doctrine has ... recognized situations in which public or social interests place limitations on the freedom of contracting
individuals." Id. at 648.
147. See Minnesota Note at 1571 (This is based on the notion that since "the function
of the media is to publish information, sources arguably assume the risk that journalists will
disclose more information than sources intend.").
148. Id. at 1577.
149. Id. (Using First Amendment tort law to illustrate this, these theorists believe that
"the First Amendment imposes such limits on press liability to enable the press to perform
its constitutionally recognized role."). Instances where the requisite degree of fault is lacking
may be exemplified by N. Y. Times v. Sullivan and Hustler v. Falwell where the Court, in
each case, found that neither publication had exhibited "actual malice" in printing the challenged information.
150. Cohen III at 265 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (citing First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776.).
151. See Levi at 657.
152. Minnesota Note at 1572. For examples of a few of the many instances where the
Court has employed some sort of balancing test to determine if First Amendment press
protections have been violated, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (The Court held that the First Amendment protected editorial discretion in "decisions made as to. . .content of the paper, and [the] treatment of public officials - whether
fair or unfair."); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (The
Court held that the First Amendment did not allow criminal punishment for the truthful
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mentator noted that a strict First Amendment analysis that serves
as a total barrier to enforcing promises of confidentiality leads to
harmful consequences, such as granting "the press unlimited power
to abrogate legitimate agreements, without regard to the harm...
[it] may cause sources, leav[ing] important interests unprotected
1 3
and tip[ping] the balance too far in favor of free press interests.""
Further, given the fact that the press may be sued in tort for defamation, invasion of privacy, and the like, "[tihere is no principled
reason to conclude that . . . [the press] must be precluded from
access to courts for redress of all breaches of confidentiality
promises by reporters."1 "4 Although a strict First Amendment approach may be more efficient 5 than any of the other approaches
discussed in this Note, basic notions of fairness and equity suggest
that the views of the source must be heard in a claim for breach of
a promise to the source.15
It is doubtful that the Court will ever "interpret its first
amendment jurisprudence to require a bar to . . . causes of action
against the press for breaching promises of confidentiality to
sources." 57 Strict First Amendment analysis simply is not faithful
to First Amendment precedent, nor is it an acceptable or fair balance of the interests of the press and the, source. However, this
should not completely preclude courts from factoring First Amendment protections into the balance.
C. Modified Contract / Limited First Amendment Approach: Balancing Applied
One commentator has noted that "requiring members of society to keep their promises is unobjectionable, [and that] . . . requiring the press to honor its contractual undertakings, or to follow generally applicable laws . . . is rarely thought to present a
publication of information obtained from the confidential proceedings of a judicial commission.); and Smith (The Court held that the First Amendment did not allow criminal punishment for the publication of lawfully obtained truthful information of a juvenile criminal
defendant's name, despite a statute prohibiting such publication.).
153. Minnesota Note at 1571-2 (footnote omitted).
154. Levi at 657.
155. One could envision that a strict First Amendment approach could create a per se
rule with regard to reporter-source confidentiality breaches that would completely preclude
a source from even advancing a claim for the breach of such a promise.
156. Even if the reporter were to give the source Miranda-like warnings, disavowing
any potential liability against future breaches, the source would still be at a disadvantage.
The only difference is that this scheme would alert the source to his disadvantageous position from the beginning of the relationship.
157. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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first amendment problem."' 58 However, in the context of confidentiality agreements between sources and reporters, these same commentators believe that press freedoms should not be limited where
"core press functions" may be abridged.' 59 Therefore, the advocates of this approach maintain that some type of balancing should
be required in order to satisfy the tensions between First Amendment press interests and source confidentiality expectations.' 0
As a result, the modified contract / limited First Amendment
approach has been proposed for addressing the breach of confidentiality agreements between reporters and sources.' 6 ' This approach, analogous to the "actual malice" standard of New York
Times v. Sullivan,"2 attempts to integrate the traditional contract
approach with the strict First Amendment approach.'6 3 To accomplish this goal, a heavier burden of proof is first placed on the
source to prove not only that a contract of confidentiality exists,
but that its terms are identifiable. 6 Secondly, borrowing from the
defamation area, it requires the source to prove that the person
promising confidentiality acted with "common law malice"'6 5 in
breaching the confidentiality promise. The first part of this modified breach of contract approach requires that sources produce
"clear and convincing evidence,

' 6

rather than a preponderance of

the evidence, that an agreement existed and that it was breached
by the media.' 7 The need for the "clear and convincing" burden of
proof is a result of the "inherent vagueness and imprecision" of
158. Minnesota Note at 1572-3 (footnotes omitted).
159. Id. at 1573. These core functions include being a conduit of information to the
public and acting as a check on the actions of the government.
160. See id. (footnote omitted) ("In developing a standard, courts must balance a
state's interest in enforcing its common-law contract rules for the benefit of news sources
against the potential abridgment of interests protected by the free press clause of the first
amendment.").
161. See generally Fed. Comm. Comment; Comm. Ent. Note; Minnesota Note.
162. See supra note 92.
163. See supra note 117.
164. Id. at 1586-7. This approach follows the judicial trend of creating specific rules
for particular types of contract cases. Whether or not the source, as opposed to the media,
should bear the heavier burden of proof is a policy choice on the part of the advocates of
this approach. See infra notes 163, 164. See also Fed. Comm. Comment at 310.
165. See Minnesota Note at 1580.
166. Minnesota Note at 1579, n. 152 ("Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof, demanding more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 271 (1986) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
167. Minnesota Note at 1579, 1580, 1584 (footnotes omitted) (Supporters of this approach claim that "the standard also gives the media 'breathing space' to make editorial
decisions about when the public interest demands that they breach a confidentiality
agreement.").
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promises of confidentiality between sources and the press.16 8 The
higher burden of proof will require the informant to demonstrate
in near-absolute terms that an actual and certain contract between
the parties was actually in existence." 9 This higher standard is
used in this approach "because a media defendant [often] faces
difficulty in refuting a source's claim that confidentiality was [actually] promised."17 0 In fact, it is also this concern that forms the
rationale supporting the decision to place this heavier burden on
the source rather than the press. Proponents of this approach
claim that this heightened burden helps to "strike a balance between strict liability for contract breaches and absolute protection
for the press."' '
The second part of this approach is also similar to defamation
law in that it requires a showing of "reckless disregard" by the
press.1 72 Similar to the "actual malice" standard employed in defamation law, this prong borrows the "reckless disregard" standard
from defamation jurisprudence and applies it to the breach of
promissed confidentiality. 173 However, the use of this standard is
not intended to be "a blind application of the Times rule.' 74 Sev168. Fed. Comm. Comment at 310 (footnote omitted). See also, Vincent Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 231, 284 (After empirically
studying over 1500 members of the media, Blasi concluded that, among other things, reporter-source relationships are often unstable and imprecise where confidentiality agreements are concerned.).
169. Id. (footnote omitted). "It is hoped that this higher burden will discourage disgruntled sources from bringing frivolous claims based on misunderstanding of a vague agreement," or when "the media entity involved denies that it promised confidentiality or disputes key terms of an alleged confidentiality agreement." Minnesota Note at 1580.
170. Minnesota Note at 1579 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 1582-3 ("So long as a journalist knows why the source seeks confidentiality,
and understands the likely harm to the source from breach, a court is likely to impose liability for such a breach.").
172. Id. at 1580-i (footnotes omitted) (This approach, however, claims that "the
meaning of reckless disregared in this context . . . differs from its meaning in the defamation context.").
173. Fed. Comm. Comment at 311 (footnote omitted) ("This will make it more difficult for juries to award vast sums, unless the source can show that the news organization
acted with culpable recklessness. Since the threat of huge punitive damage awards deters
news organizations from exploring controversial areas with great potential for liability, this
requirement will offset that chilling effect."). See also Minnesota Note at 1580, 1581 ("A
heightened burden of proof is necessary to preserve first amendment values ....
To impose
liability under this standard, a factfinder must find that the media. . . published the information in violation of the confidentiality agreement without giving due deference to the
source's rights.").
174. Minnesota Note at 1580, 1581 (footnote omitted) (At least the proponents of this
approach claim it is not. They claim that "although New York Times and its progeny generally ilustrate the weight courts should give the competing interests involved in such a case,
the nature of the contract cause of action and of the competing interests to be balanced
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eral considerations are necessary in order to determine whether
recklessness exists. Among them are "the extent of a media defendant's knowledge of the reasons why a source requested confidentiality, the defendant's reason for publishing the specific information, and the newsworthiness of that information."17' 5 Therefore,
when this approach is applied, a trier of fact who finds the information that is published to be extremely newsworthy, may not
even find the existence of recklessness. In fact, this would be the
case "even if [the] journalist knew that [this] disclosure could
17 6
cause a [particular] source great harm."
Proponents claim that the end result of this arrangement is
that sources will be given "a strong incentive to carefully negotiate
the terms of confidentiality agreements," as well as "an incentive
to make certain that reporters understand the consequences of
breaching such agreements. 17 7 This is true regardless of what the
source may have to lose. Therefore, as opposed to the strict First
Amendment approach, the media is restricted from being able to
freely breach an agreement merely because a 4ource has little to
17 8
lose from the breach.
One commentator has even suggested adding several considerations to the balance when using this approach. While these considerations may only further complicate an already complex approach, this commentator has suggested that the addition of these
factors to the balancing process will help the press equalize the
inequities that proponents of this approach perceive to exist between the source and the media. The considerations that have
been suggested include: "(1) the public's need to know the source's
identity; 179 (2) the importance of the attributed information to
preclude simple application of the Times standard.").
175. Id. at 1581 ("[Sluch considerations are significant because 'reckless disregard' is a
standard of culpability that has meaning only when the defendant's conduct is measured
against competing considerations.") (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 1583 (This approach "[riecognizes that a recklessness standard requires a
factfinder to weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct against the foreseeable harm to the
plantiff.").
177. Id. at 1582 ("So long as a journalist knows why the source seeks confidentiality,
and understands the likely harm to the source from breach, a court is likely to impose liability for such a breach.").
178. Id. at 1582, 1583.
179. Fed. Comm. Comment at 312 ("If the public will be significantly misled by not
knowing the source of the information the balance leans toward disclosure. However, if the
source's identity will not appreciably change the public's perception of the credibility of the
information, then the source's interests should prevail."). This is exactly the case in Cohen.
Additionally, if the source is a public figure whose identity would, in itself, be newsworthy
as a part of the story, the public's need to know would be significant. See also Cohen VI at
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public debate;18 (3) the severity of the harm suffered by the
(4) the specificity of the disclosure;18 2 (5) the circumsource;'
stances surrounding the formation of the contract;"8 3 and (6) the
history and clarity of the relationship and the agreement. 1 81 4 Each
may also be included as sub-parts
of these considerations, however,
18 5
of those already outlined.
Advocates of this approach claim that its benefits are two-fold.
First, they believe it will act as a shield for the press against any
chilling effects that can result from claims for "imprecise agreements" for confidentiality. Also, this approach leaves room for
some amount of editorial freedom that the press may wish to exercise in breaching agreements where they do not "recklessly ignore"
the deleterious effects that these breaches will have on the
source. 186 At least one commentator has disagreed, however, stating
that "[tlhe importation of the reckless disregard standard from the
2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Fed. Comm. Comment at 312, 313 (This "depends on how vital the information is
to public debate. If the information concerns a trivial matter, then the identity of the source
is unimportant to the public. However, if the information pertains to a controversial issue,
then how the public shapes its discussion of the issue may very well depend on knowledge of
the source."). This consideration is also fraught with problems. An issue that is "controversial" to some may not be controversial to all, and even assuming that it is, the identity of
the source linked to the issue may not be helpful in shaping public opinion on that issue.
Also, the nature and motive(s) of the source are very difficult to measure due to their inherent subjectivity and the danger of injecting moral judgements into the calculus.
181. Id. ("Measuring the gravity of the source's interest depends largely on the severity of the harm to the source from the disclosure. If the source is a 'whistleblower' who
reveals corruption in an institution or in government, disclosure will probably subject the
source to severe economic, mental, and perhaps even physical harm . . . . On the other
hand, a source with a questionable past is less likely to suffer damage to his 'reputation' and
thus is less deserving of redress." ).
182. Id. at 314 ("How specifically the reference is attributed to the source is important
in determining the severity of his injury."). In other words, whether or not a reader of the
story is able to determine the identity of the source of the story, as well as the source's
relationship to the story aids in proportionally determining the extent of the source's injury.
See also supra note 3.
183. Id. at 315 ("A showing of fraud or deception by either party in the making of the
agreement would seriously weaken that party's relative interest under this balancing
approach.").
184. Id. at 317 ("Although under this scheme the plantiff would have to prove the
existence of an agreement by clear and convincing proof, evidence of the history of the
relationship and the terms of this and past confidentiality agreements would be helpful in
weighing the competing interests.").
185. Minnesota Note at 1585 ("[Giving the press some protection against source contract suits should not cause sources to become generally less willing to speak to journalists.
[Slources are already exposed to disclosure in the course of judicial proceedings, and evidently are not thereby deterred from communicating with the press.").
186. Levi at 660 ("By contrast to the defamation context, the disclosures at issue in
contract actions by sources consist of true information.").
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defamation area is neither workable nor constitutionally
required."' 7
This criticism maintains that importing the reckless disregard
standard from defamation law to contract actions for breaches of
confidentiality necessitates that the standard be written "in terms
of reckless disregard as to the effects of the disclosure" rather than
"in terms of the press' knowledge of the substantive character of
the information.

18 8

Also, it is claimed that not all confidential

sources possess expectations of anonymity that are "prima facie
valuable."' 89 Further, the fear of a chill on press freedoms "at least
theoretically" affects not only the press, but each side of the
balance.' 90
Lastly, it is claimed that since the Constitution allows for the
complete "chill" of many types of speech, as well as the partial
"chill" of many others, the First Amendment does not prohibit restrictions that may result in press self-censorship.'l Thus, the application of "heightened fault standards" to sources that are intended to minimize the chill on all types of political speech gained
through promises of confidentiality by the press may not be appropriate in analyzing confidentiality cases. 9 " While it has been argued that this scheme will induce sources to be more specific when
making their "contracts" for confidentiality, the actual result may
be quite different. In fact, sources fearing exposure may be more
reluctant to come forward with their information in the first
187. Id. ("Given that confidentiality is always requested self-protectively and that reporters inevitably know of some potentially harmful effect to the source of being identified,

it is difficult to discern how voluntary disclosures by the press would not virtually always
rise to the level of reckless disregard.").
188. Id. at 661, 662 (footnotes omitted) ("Even if the interest in confidentiality at
issue in contract actions by sources were presumed to have some baseline social value, there
is no reason to suppose that such a state interest in confidentiality would have to remain
constant across all promises of anonymity to all sources.. . . Thus, it begs the question to
propose a balancing approach analogous to the one used in the tort context on the basis of
an assumption of equivalent legitimacy in the interests to be balanced. . . . In other words,
some degree of self-censorship is a danger for either rule regarding enforcement in contract
actions.. . . In any event, the possibility and extent of chilling effects - whether on sources
or reporters - are less certain and predictable in the confidentiality context than in the
defamation cases, thereby again casting doubt on the appropriateness of the defamation
analogy.") (footnotes omitted).
189. Id. at 662.
190. See id. at 664-5 (footnotes omitted). A failure to enforce confidentiality promises
could not only "discourage sources from sharing information with the press, thereby limiting
information available to the public," but "the possibility of extensive damage awards in
contract actions may lead reporters to minimize their reliance on confidential sources and to
forego stories based on unattributed information." Id. at 662.
191. Levi at 665 (footnotes omitted).
192. Id. (footnote omitted).
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3

Most importantly, this balancing would become exponentially
more complicated with each additional consideration that is included in the balance. In fact, for this type of balancing to result in
a speedy and smooth application, the number of factors must be
kept as small as possible, and the factors considered must lend
themselves to a speedy and minimally subjective determination.
To ignore these realities of actual application will result in decisions that are, at their worst, subject to the changing whims of
courts and judges, and, at their best, lengthy and economically
194
burdensome on both the press and the source.
D. Estopping
Approach

The

Press:

The

Promissory Estoppel

A fourth mode of analysis applied to reporter-source confidentiality agreements consists of two parts, and is best explained by
the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion in Cohen v. Cowles Media.
Although this type of analysis varies in degree, it can generally be
defined as a promissory estoppel analysis. Before applying this
analysis, the Court articulated two reasons not to apply traditional
contract analysis. 195 The Court found that the "contracts" at issue
were not even intended by the parties to be legally binding, 19 and
that under these circumstances, the imposition of traditional contract law would be too rigid in light of the "special ethical relationship" that existed between the parties. 19 Thus, the court justified
193. See Minnesota Note at 1575. Cf Langley and Levine at 25 (Claiming that sources
with newsworthy information wanting it to be disseminated to the public, disclose the information regardless of the protection that was granted. In other words, their primary goal was
to have the information published, rather than have it be contingent on a grant of
confidentiality.).
194. See generally, Colldeweih and Levi.
195. See Levi at 666, n. 187 (This author asserts that in doing so, the Court "avoided
the question of state action and the First Amendment.").
196. Cohen IV at 203 (The court came to this conclusion after finding that in the
"special" context of newsgathering where "promises are usually given clandestinely and
orally, [and] are often vague, [and] subject to misunderstanding" neither the reporters nor
the source believe that they are creating a "legally binding contract."). Whether or not it
was a correct conclusion under the circumstances, the court asserted it as being one of the
reasons it based its decision on promissory estoppel principals rather than contract
principals.
197. Id. (The court found that the reporters and the source "are not thinking in terms
of offers and acceptances in any commercial or business sense." They both "understand that
the reporter's promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment" that, by itself, cannot
support a contract.). However, if all sources thought that the promises were being given only
as a "moral commitment," it would seem to follow that they would also realize that a "moral
commitment" is, at the very least, shaky ground to rest a disclosure on. Moreover, if their
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its use of a promissory estoppel analysis.
Recognizing that promissory estoppel will "impl[y] a contract
in law where none exists in fact,"19 the court stated that "a promise expected or reasonably expected to induce definite action by
the promisee that does induce action is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcing the promise."19 9 As to the first requirement, the court found that the newspapers. unquestionably prom20 0
ised Cohen that he would be treated as an anonymous source.
According to the court, this promise was intended to prompt Co20
hen to hand over the information that he had to the reporters. 1
Expecting the promise to be kept,2 02 Cohen furnished the reporters
with the information.20 ° However, the third requirement "that injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise,"2 necessitated that the court look at what it termed "a transaction fraught
'205
with moral ambiguity.
To this end, the court did not limit its inquiry to only whether
there was a promise and whether it was broken, but instead the
court examined each of the reasons why the promise was broken. 206
Emphasizing that there can never be a neutral approach to the
First Amendment,20 7 the court "weigh[ed] the same considerations
. . . weighed for whether the First Amendment ha[d] been violated. 202 This was done to determine "whether 'injustice' would
[have] result[ed] from a refusal to enforce [the] promise. ' 20 9 Thus,
the court balanced the interest of the state in protecting promises
of confidentiality against First Amendment press freedoms. 21 0 As a
result, First Amendment press interests became part of this court's
promissory estoppel analysis. The final balance weighed "constituidentity were found out they would be subject to either economic loss (as a result of being
fired) or the scorn of others (whether co-workers, employers, or the public).
198. Id. at 203.
199. Id. at 203-4 (footnote omitted).
200. Id. at 204.
201. Id.
202. See Petitioners Brief at 3.
203. Cohen IV at 204.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 202 (By "moral ambiguity," the court was making a reference to the evidentiary record of the case that contained "the unanimous testimony of reporters, editors,
and journalism experts [who claimed] that protecting a confidential source of a news story is
a sacred trust, a matter of 'honor,' of 'morality,' and required by professional ethics.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id. (This required the court to balance "the common law interest in protecting a
promise of anonymity" against First Amendment press interests.).
209. See Cohen IV at 199.
210. Id. at 205.
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tional rights of a free press against . . . common law interest[s] in
protecting a promise of anonymity." 21 ' Admitting that this could
"mean second-guessing the newspaper editors, 2 12 the court held
that the "enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a
promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First
Amendment rights. 2 1 ' Although the court left open the possibility
that situations could exist that would entitle a confidential source
to a promissory estoppel remedy, they restricted it to instances
where the considerations of the First Amendment are outweighed
by the interest of the state in enforcing the confidentiality
promise. 1 4
One criticism regarding the inclusion of First Amendment considerations in the promissory estoppel approach was voiced by the
Minnesota Supreme Court dissent when it claimed that doing so
would "carve out yet another special privilege in favor of the press
that is denied other citizens."21 5 While the dissenters found that
the press should be free to "print anything they choose to print,"
they also required that the press be held "legally responsible" for
any broken promises of confidentiality or negligent acts connected
to what the press chooses to print. 21" Additionally, a rather basic
criticism noted by one recent commentator is that the Minnesota
Supreme Court never fully explained its rationale for concluding
that confidentiality promises between the media and sources
should not be legally binding.2 1 7
The major criticism of this approach, however, is that while
requiring "a complex balancing of factors," and "observ[ing] the
complexities of the relationship" involved in typical confidentiality
agreements between reporters and sources, the Minnesota Supreme C6urt "neatly sidestepped the obligations it had deemed
211. Id.
212. Id. (footnotes omitted). This may be a necessary evil when attempting to protect
First Amendment freedoms.
213. Id. (A primary reason for this conclusion was that the confidentiality promise
came about "in the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public debate"
regarding "a political source involved in a political campaign" where civil suits based on the
breach of confidentiality could "chill public debate.").
214. See id. Unfortunately, the court neglects to mention what such a case would look
like.
215. Cohen IV at 205 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 206 (The dissent found that the analysis should be "free of any special
protection carved out by New York Times v. Sullivan or any of its progeny.").
217. Levi at 670 (footnote omitted) ("The court asked (without answering) . ..
whether the source's identity was newsworthy and whether characterizations short of outright identification would have served the press' asserted reasons for disclosure.").
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necessary. '21 8 Thus, the court never really provided a clear explanation of the factors to be considered or the weight afforded each
when using a promissory estoppel analysis. Finally, the court did
not explain how the considerations involved in its First Amendment-sensitive balance would be applied to situations that are not
political in nature.
E. Considering All
Approach

The

Factors: The

Contextualist

Another approach offered as a way to analyze a suit for the
breach of a reporter-source confidentiality agreement may be
called the contextualist approach. 1 9 In contrast to the other approaches discussed in this Note, as well as most approaches in
First Amendment jurisprudence, this method relies on "a historically and democratically grounded" scheme that is intended "to
foster an attitude and direct a sensibility," rather than a more
traditional balancing of interests test.2 20 This approach requires
that courts "develop richly textured pictures of the circumstances
of confidentiality and where they fall on the imaginary spectrum
between the whistleblower and the strategic manipulator." 2 2 '
The contextualist approach recommends that triers of fact address five important considerations in the determination of
whether the press should be held accountable for confidentiality
218. Id. at 670 (Unfortunately, the court "neither balanced nor provided the criteria
for doing so;" [and] "[wihen faced with the complexity of the task required, and the fact
that it would involve a series of explicit value choices to decide when deniability by sources
is desirable, the Cohen court threw up its hands.").
219. Id. at 714 ("fA~lthough this will require courts explicitly to measure shades of
gray, guideposts in that project can be discerned from the cultural values underlying our
sympathy for whistleblowers and from the realities of the press' relationship with government."). See infra note 221. See supra note 182.
220. Levi at 715. This is the basic difficulty with this approach. Whether or not it is a
sensitive and fair way to explore the problems created by a breach of reporter-source confidentiality, it is perhaps better suited for theoretical discussions rather than a realistic
method of resolving disputes that are constrained by limited judicial resources. The judicial
energy required to "develop richly textured pictures," etc., seems enormous. One can only
imagine a panel of judges, or even one judge, mulling over the question of where to place a
source on the "imaginary spectrum" that this approach describes. Even a novice barely
versed in the realities of judicial decision-making could understand how much of a drain on
judicial resources that the adoption of this approach could cause. See also, Dan Paul, Why a
Shield Law, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 459 (1975) (This author opposes a case-by-case approach
to the settlement of reporter-source confidentiality disputes because of the'financial costs
involved, as well as the uncertainty of legal results.).
221. See id. at 715 (This article provides a comprehensive definition of
"whistleblower" and "strategic manipulator"). See supra note 182.
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breaches:2 22 "(1) the character of the source's substantive information; (2) the source's reasons for leaking; (3) the relevance of the
source's identity; (4) the press' reasons for disclosure; and (5) the
nature of the relationship between the reporter and the source."223
While the inclusion of these factors gives this method the appearance of a balancing of interests or totality of the circumstances ap24
proach, it is not, nor does it claim to be.
The first consideration the contextualist approach examines is
the "character of the source's information. 2 2 5 When addressing
this consideration, the approach suggests that courts examine four
characteristics: (1) "falsity; 2 2 6 (2) "press manipulation;12 7 (3) its
"nature and importance;"2 and (4) the "criminality of the original
disclosure."22 9 The examination of the four characteristics that
support "the character of the source's substantive information" is
important- to the eventual determination of whether .the First
Amendment protects the press' breach of confidentiality.
The next consideration this approach suggests courts address
222. Id.
223. Id. at 716 (By including these considerations in the analysis, this approach "cautions judges to eschew comforting platitudes about the press either as a fierce guardian of
freedom or as an unprincipled seeker after fortune . . . [and] . . . explicitly requires them
to focus on the actual democratic values at stake in the interactions between the press and
its confidential sources."). Although these considerations are intended to implicate the
"democratic values at stake" when confidentiality promises are given and breached by the
press, the contextualist approach never defines these "democratic values." The contextualist
approach claims that the five considerations included in its analysis are not to be balanced
against each other by triers of fact, but rather are just to be addressed with no particular
weight or emphasis placed on any one consideration.
224. See Levi at 715.
225. Levi at 715.
226. Id. (footnote omitted) (This characterization is claimed to be important
"[blecause by and large the press is the only mass conduit of most information, manipulating or misleading the press necessarily disempowers the public as well.").
227. Id. at 718 (This characterization is claimed to be important because "[tlhe nature
and importance of the information provided by the source are obviously relevant both to the
substantive concern of promoting well-informed public discourse and to the institutional
value of enhancing the independent, critical role of the press.").
228. Id. at 719 (footnote omitted) (This approach claims this characteristic is valuable
because "[tlhe press defendant will presumably argue, as a threshold or categorical matter,
that its promise of confidentiality should not be enforced when the initial leak by the source
-would itself constitute a criminal act or would otherwise violate statutes or administrative
rules.").
229. Id. (This characteristic is claimed to be important because "[s]ometimes, the
source's subordinate role in her hierarchy and her whistle-blowing reasons for leaking will be
clear. Similarly, it will sometimes be obvious that a source with a political interest in an
issue engaged in a trial balloon or policy leak. Conversely, the fact that the exposed information had little relevance to the leaker's position and occupation might suggest that the
information was revealed for ego, goodwill, or animus reasons.").
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is "the source's reasons for leaking" the information.23 0 This has
been claimed to be necessary in order to get a better picture of the
context of the moment the original promise of confidentiality was
made.23 1 Under this approach, courts are also required to consider
"the relevance of the source's identity. '232 This requires an inquiry
into the reasons the source asked for confidentiality and "whether,
and to what extent, his identity was relevant to the story" given to
the newspapers. 3 3 This, too, has been claimed to aid in the determination of the extent of First Amendment protections available
to the press. Additionally, the contextualist approach examines
"the press' reasons for [the] disclosure "234 in order to reveal the
character of the press' motive(s). 235 The approach warns, however,
that this may not be easy, and "cannot be considered independently of other factors. 2 36 Lastly, the contextualist approach recommends that "the nature of the relationship" be considered.2 3
By looking into the "power" and "sophistication" of the source, as
well as the "relationship" between the source and the reporter, this
analysis hopes to determine whether enforcing the promise of confidentiality would be "fair. 2 3 8 In so doing, the contextualist approach suggests that courts examine two characteristics of the "nature of the relationship between the reporter and source." These
characteristics include "the particular dynamics of the interaction"
and the "specificity of the non-disclosure agreement. '239 These
230. Id.
231. Id. at 720. This results in necessarily characterizing the promise in a light
favorable to the source and not the press, or vice-versa.
232. Id. at 720-1 (footnote omitted) (This has been claimed to be "useful in determining whether the disclosure of the source's identity permitted the press to assert its independence and to trigger a readjustment of the distribution of power between the government
and its citizens.").
233. Id. at 722.
234. Id. (However, it must be kept in mind that this is multi-dimensional and, in fact,
"there may be multiple motivations for a particular breach of a promise of
confidentiality.").
235. This approach implies that the motive(s) behind the disclosure help to determine
the extent of First Amndment protections available to the press. In fact, the motives behind
the action of either the source or the press may not even be relevant. See infra notes 246 287 and accompanying text.
236. Levi at 725.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 726 (footnote omitted) (Courts should not only examine the "dynamics of
the relationship between the reporter and the source," but they should also look at the
'particulars of the agreement of confidentiality" in order to best determine whether or not
the source and the reporter "initially understood one another's assurances and expectations." This is due to the fact that many reporter-source confidentiality promises are given
orally and some are even "implicit or are sought part-way through the process of disclosure
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characteristics are examined in order to aid courts in their determination of whether the First Amendment may protect the press'
disclosure of the identity of the confidential source.2 Thus, this
approach attempts to provide "a reality-based framework for the
judicial descriptive moment," through a "richly descr[iptive]" look
at the press and its history.

241

Although the contextualist analysis stands apart from the
other approaches discussed in this Note, it is far from perfect. As a
result of the scheme's basic "assumption that the judicial decisionmaking process is not too different from the highly context-sensitive way in which we regularly make decisions in our lives,"2 ' it is
of little or no use to a judiciary that either does not, or cannot,
render its decisions as we make them in our lives. Indeed, this is
usually the case because most courts are constrained by crowded
calenders and limited resources that have made it traditionally
more efficient to rely on balancing tests, and the like, when addressing issues of constitutional significance. The contextualist approach also requires courts to be sensitive to the "power," "position," and "motivation," of sources and reporters as well as the
"effects" of the disclosure of the source's identity.2 43 However, admitting that "[a]ny proposal that appears to invoke a variety of
contextual factors.

. .

inevitably raises questions about identifying

methodology," the implication is raised that the approach is incomplete.2 44 In fact, it is. While it offers several factors to consider,
it does not preclude the addition of other factors nor the subtraction of current ones. This uncertainty makes the realistic application of this approach even more difficult. The framework employed
by this approach claims to be "reality-based," yet its application is
far from being so. Unfortunately, since the application of this approach denies the reality of judicial decision-making, it simply canrather than at the beginning.").
240. Id. According to this approach, an explanation of these characteristics will necessarily result in finding out "what is truly at stake for the culturally valued norms of wellinformed public discourse, democratic government, and an independent press" that form

the rationale behind the First Amendment. Id.
241. Id. at 717.
242. Id. at 715. Professor Levi gives no specific legal examples of "context-sensitive"
ways decisions are made, but says that it "does not attempt the theoretical project of articulating jurisprudential justifications for the approach it suggests. Nor does it seek formally to
espouse any particular decisionmaking theory in the social science literature." Instead, this
approach "is intended both to suggest and to represent a useful, common-sensical way of
structuring and guiding judicial inquiries." Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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not serve as a realistic alternative to the resolution of suits for the
breach of confidentiality promises.

IV. AN

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Now that the five common methods of analyzing the breach of
confidentiality agreements between the media and anonymous
sources have been examined, this Note will offer an alternative.
This alternative method of analysis satisfies the concerns of both
the press and the source while offering adequate protection to
each. To do so, it borrows from the promissory estoppel approach,241 5 the contextualist approach,2 46 and the modified contract
/ limited First Amendment approach.24 7 Thus, this alternative con' 48
siders the First Amendment protections granted to the press,
the First Amendment obligations the press has to the public, 4 9 the
interest of the state in enforcing the press' promise of confidentiality,25 the interest of the source in having the press' promise
kept, 5 ' and the source's interest in maintaining its anonymity once
confidentiality has been promised.2 52 At the same time, this approach is able to remain within the confines established by the Supreme Court decision in Cohen."3 In essence, this alternative integrates First Amendment protections and specific press-sourcesociety considerations into a traditional promissory estoppel analysis,- in order to create a workable analytic approach that can be
realistically applied to the disposition of suits for reporter-source
breaches of confidentiality.
As previously discussed, each of the five current approaches to
245. See supra notes 196 - 219 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 220 - 245 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 152 - 195 and accompanying text.
248. See U.S. Const. amend 1. See also Smith v. Daily Mail at 97 (The Court held
that "absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order," the press may print
"lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information about a matter of public significance.").
249. American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles,Article I ("The
primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to serve the general welfare and enabling them to make judgments on the issues of the time.").
250. The state's interest is in maintaining "stable relationships by allowing individuals
to rely on others' promises and by compensating parties when agreements are breached."
Levi at 645.
251. If it is the case that the source relied on the press' promise, the rationale for this
element is self-evident.
252. This consideration is founded on the source's expectation of privacy, as well as
principles of reliance.
253. Although the Supreme Court held that state promissory estoppel statutes are
laws of general applicability which are not superceded by the First Amendment, they did
not foreclose its consideration in the balance inherent in promissory estoppel analysis.
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the resolution of reporter-source confidentiality breaches have individual problems that make them unworkable, impractical, or unsuited to the task. 5 4 Moreover, the Cohen Court seems to have
foreclosed the application of all but one of these five approaches namely, the promissory estoppel approach.2 55 Although the Court
held that the First Amendment cannot totally bar suits against the
press for the breach of a confidentiality promise to a source, the
Court did not foreclose the inclusion of First Amendment protections in the balancing test inherent in the third prong of traditional promissory estoppel analysis.2 56 As a result, this Note is able
to advocate a First Amendment-sensitive promissory estoppel approach to resolve reporter-source confidentiality disputes. Thus,
First Amendment interests are included in this analysis.
This First Amendment-sensitive approach requires courts to
individually address the three prongs that compose traditional
promissory estoppel law. As defined by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, these include whether or not: (1) "a promise [existed that
was] expected or reasonably expected to induce definite action by
the promissee," (2) the promise "induce[d] action" by the promisee, and (3) "injustice can be avoided by enforcing the promise."21 5 7 It is under each prong that the considerations and concerns
of the press, the source, and society are included in order to produce an equitable result.
Under the first prong, the nature of the original promise of
confidentiality is examined. 8 This is necessary to protect the interest of the state in enforcing the press' promise of confidentiality,
the interest of the source in having the press' promise (if any)
kept, and the interests of the press in protecting itself from false or
frivolous claims. Of course, an examination of the nature of the
promise will require triers of fact to closely scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the actual exchange between the press and the
source,259 as well as the context of the situation. 6 0 Therefore, this
examination allows triers of fact to use the same tools and methods
they have traditionally used in determining whether or not any
promise had existed between two opposing parties.
Under the second prong, the reaction to the promise of confi254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See generally, supra section II.
See supra notes 196 -219 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207 - 219 and accompanying text.
Cohen IV at 204.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 220 - 245 and accompanying text.
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dentiality is examined. This is required to protect the interest of
the source in maintaining its privacy once the promise has been
given, as well as to protect the press from fraudulent or bad faith
disclosures by the source. Like the first prong, this necessitates
that courts engage in a relatively subjective determination based
on the facts of the disclosure. Thus, there is no need to look at the
motives behind the source's disclosure.2 ' In fact, all that need be
examined is the specific disclosure itself. Again, this examination
will require triers of fact to closely scrutinize the actual exchange
between the source and the reporter. To do so, courts need only
use the tools and methods they have traditionally used in determining whether any bargain has been satisfied.
The subjectivity inherent in the determination of both the
first and second prongs of this analysis not only enhances the general desirability of the approach, but also emphasizes the ease of
its application. Since both the first and second prongs require a
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the agreement existed and was breached by the press, the fairness of this approach
becomes evident.2" 2 The need for this higher burden of proof stems
from the vague and imprecise nature of the confidentiality agreement itself. 26 3 Borrowed from the modified contract / limited First
Amendment approach, this standard of proof is required because
the press often "faces difficulty in refuting a source's claim that
confidentiality was promised." 2 "
The third prong of this approach does not enjoy the same level
of subjectivity as the first two. In fact, this prong - whether or not
injustice can be avoided by enforcing the promise - is objective. As
such, it requires courts to engage in exacting and complex decisionmaking processes and, for the sake of the the First Amendment, it
should.2165 Probably the most vital of the three prongs, the third
prong of the First Amendment-sensitive promissory estoppel approach is not mutually exclusive of the other two. Even if the first
two prongs reveal that a confidentiality agreement was made and
breached by the press, and the source revealed the information
that was promised, the issue of whether or not injustice can be
261. See supra note 241.
262. See supra note 165.
263. See supra notes 165 -172.
264. Minnesota Note at 1579 (footnote ommitted).
265. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court described this inquiry as being "fraught
with moral ambiguity," this approach will attempt to dispell this concern by advancing
more specific interests that society, the source, and the media have and that the court did
not explain. Cohen IV at 202.
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avoided by enforcing this promise will be dispositive of the larger
issue of press liability.
In order to integrate First Amendment protections into this
prong, a balancing test is required. This test empowers triers of
fact to balance the interests of both the state and the source in
enforcing the promise against the First Amendment interests of society and the press. The only court to have adopted a version of
this balancing test for use in determining the outcome of reportersource confidentiality breaches has been the Minnesota Supreme
Court.2 6 However, in doing so, the court never specifically 2 6set
7
forth the considerations that must be included in the balance.
Striking a balance in favor of either the press or the source
necessarily requires courts to "articulate, measure and compare"
the competing interests involved. 268 Thus, several specific considerations must be scrutinized. First, the considerations that address
the interests in enforcing the promise are examined. These include:
the nature of the source; the severity of the harm suffered by the
source; the history and clarity of the relationship between the
source and the press; and the history and clarity of the original
confidentiality agreement. It is important *thateach of these considerations be given equal weight 2 9 in determining the level of interest that the source and the state have in compensating the
27
breach of confidentiality.
Examining the nature of the source is important in determining which way the balance will tilt because it indicates both the
level of public scrutiny that the source is accustomed to, 271 and the
degree of privacy that the source is entitled to. 272 If the source is a
private individual, never before subject to public scrutiny, the balance will tilt in favor of the source. On the other hand, if the
source is a public figure, the balance would favor the press.
Next, the severity of the harm suffered by the source is important in determining the balance. This consideration is straightforward - the worse the harm suffered by the source, the more the
266. See generally, Cohen IV.
267. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
268. Cohen IV at 202.
269. See supra notes 127 - 130.
270. See Cohen VI (Only compensatory damages may be sought.). Although the Cohen court only addressed the issue of damages, this test could theoretically be used in seeking preliminary relief. However, this would implicate important prior restraint questions
that may even bar such an approach.
271. This is similar to the distinction between public and private individuals in First
Amendment defamation jurisprudence.
272. This is also borrowed from general defamation law.
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balance will favor the source. Of course, if the source suffers only
minor harm, the balance will naturally shift toward the press.273
The clarity and history of the relationship between the source
and the press, as well as the clarity and history of their original
agreement, aid in deciding which way the balance will tilt. Although the first two prongs of this approach require that the
source must prove both the existence and breach of an agreement
by clear and convincing evidence, the circumstances constituting
the relationship, and the making and terms of the agreement also
aid in weighing the competing interests.27 For example, if the relationship is somewhat nebulous,' 75 and the agreement and its terms
are not specific, 2 76 the balance will favor the press. On the other
hand, if the relationship is certain, and the terms of the agreement
specific, the balance will lean toward the source.
Since any balancing of interests approach relies on the equitable resolution of competing interests, the side of the balance that
addresses the First Amendment interests of society and the press
necessitates the inclusion of several additional considerations.
These are: the newsworthiness of the information; the public's
need to know the identity of the source and the relevance of the
source's identity to the story; the importance of the revelation of
the source's identity to public debate; and the specificity of the
disclosure itself. The inclusion of these considerations addresses
First Amendment interests and completes the analysis. Again, it is
important that each consideration be afforded equal weight in calculating the final balance.
The newsworthiness of the information is a relevant factor because it is an indication of the level that "well-informed public discourse"2 77 is enhanced.-In fact, Article I of the Ethical Principles of
the American Society of Newspaper Editors states that "[t]he primary purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion is to
serve the general welfare by informing the people and enabling
them to make judgments on the issues of the time. 2 78 As a result,
the more newsworthy the identity of the source, the more the bal273. See supra note 180.
274. See supra notes 184 - 185 and accompanying text.
275. One time sources that do not make it clear that they are speaking with the press
in confidence, and sources that have had existing, non-confidential relationships with the
reporter may fall into this catagory.
276. "Specific" refers to the exactness of the agreement.
277. Levi at 718, 726. See supra note 228.
278. American Society of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles,Article I. See
also Cohen VI (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ance is weighted in favor of the press. On the other hand, if the
identity of the source has little or no value as news, the balance
will shift in favor of the source. Although this approach admits the
subjectivity inherent in the examination of a consideration such as
"newsworthiness," it is a necessary consideration in the measureit is an interment of the competing interests involved. Moreover,
27 9
est that courts have measured in the past.
Next, the public's need to know the identity of the source and
the relevance of the source's identity to the story, is relevant in
determining the balance. Thus, courts must examine whether or
not the continued anonymity of the source will "significantly mislead" the public in its full understanding of the story.2 8 If the
public will not be misled by the continued anonymity of the
source, the balance will lean towards the source. 281 However, if
"not knowing the source" will "significantly" mislead the public,
the balance will shift in favor of the press. 282 For example, if the
source is a public figure whose identity would be newsworthy as a
part of the story, the public's need to know would be significant.
Additionally, the more relevant a source's identity is to the story,
the more the balance will favor the press, while the less relevant it
is, the more the balance will tilt toward the source. Therefore, as
the source's relevance to the story increases, so too does the public's need to know the source's identity.
The importance of the revelation of the source's identity to
public debate must also be factored into the balance. This consideration is dependent "on how vital the information is to public debate. '28 3 "If the information concerns a trivial matter, then the
identity of the source is unimportant to the public. '284 However,
"if the information pertains to a controversial issue, then how the
public shapes its decision of the issue may very well depend on
knowledge of the source. ' ' 28 As a result, if the revelation is important to public debate, the balance will shift in favor of the press,
but if the revelation is of little or no importance to public debate,
the balance will tilt toward the source.
Finally, the specificity of the disclosure must be examined and
279. See e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
280. See generally, Cohen VI
281. FED. COMM. Comment at 312.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 313.
284. Id.
285. Id.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/10

40

Petruzzi: <em>Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.</em>: Burning Sources and Burning Q
19931

COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA CO.

weighed into the balance. By and large, this factor goes to the degree of injury suffered by the source.28 6 Consequently, the more
specific the disclosure is, the more the balance will shift toward the
source. However, the less specific the disclosure by the press, and
the less an average reader is able to determine the source's relationship to the story, the more the balance will favor the press.
In sum, this alternative approach is designed to take into consideration the interests of the press, the source, and society when
determining whether or not the press should be held liable for a
breach of reporter-source confidentiality. By equitably balancing
these interests within a traditional promissory estoppel analysis, a
workable analytic approach is created that can be realistically applied by courts. For these reasons, as well as the others outlined
above, this Note advocates the application of this First Amendment-sensitive promissory estoppel approach for resolving disputes
over the breach of reporter-source confidentiality promises.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Cohen Court seems to make it clear that
First Amendment press protections are on slippery ground. Not
only may the press be punished for refusing to disclose confidential
sources,28 7 it may now be punished for disclosing a confidential
source. 288 As Cohen illustrates, the Court is currently unwilling to
explicitly offer First Amendment protections as part of its consideration of whether the press may disclose a confidential source.
Worse yet, the Cohen opinion offers little in the way of novel analysis. Given the background of the case, the decisions of the lower
courts, and the variety of approaches discussed by commentators,
it is surprising that the Court's opinion occupies as little space in
the reporter as it does.
Although the Court seems to endorse the promissory estoppel
approach, albeit not an explicit First Amendment-sensitive approach, the Court does nothing to provide the tools necessary to
balance the competing interests at stake. Thus, a mode of analysis
is needed to equitably calculate and weigh these competing interests. As discussed, a better approach is a hybrid of the promissory
286. Thus, if a reader is able to determine the identity of the source of the story, as
well as the source's relationshiip to the story, the greater the harm is to the source. See also
Fed. Comm. Comment at 314.
287. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
288. Cohen VI at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting) (The "punishment" is presumably economic in nature.).
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estoppel, 89 contextualist,12 9 and modified contract / limited First
2 9
Amendment approach.
This alternative combines specific press, source, and societal
considerations with First Amendment protections under a promissory estoppel analysis that equitably resolves disputes concerning
the breach of reporter-source confidentiality agreements. 292 Thus,
triers of fact can be provided with the certainty of realistic application that a balancing approach provides, as well as the equity and
fairness provided by the inclusion of specific considerations that
address source, press, and societal interests. Also, this approach
would empower courts to consider First Amendment press protections while affording sources a remedy for their detrimental reliance on the press' breached promise.
The analysis of suits for the breach of reporter-source confidentiality agreements has been, and continues to be, exceedingly
complex. However, as courts and commentators struggled to determine which approach best fit these cases, the Supreme Court,
through its Cohen decision, seemed to limit the selection to only
one - the promissory estoppel approach.2 93 Fortunately, however,
their decision did not completely foreclose the inclusion of First
Amendment considerations. As a result, the alternative approach
discussed in this Note is not only able to remain within the mandate set by the Court, but to include adequate protections for
press, source, and societal interests. Foremost among these protections are those granted by the First Amendment.
By applying this First Amendment-sensitive promissory estoppel analysis, whether or not an agreement between the reporter
and the source actually existed, whether or not the source expected
the agreement to be kept, and whether "injustice" 29 4 can be
avoided by enforcing this promise can be ascertained. While the
first two prongs of this approach are concerned with the nuts and
bolts of the promise, the resolution of the third prong implicitly
requires a balancing of interests.
It has been said that "[s]ome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legiti289. See supra notes 196 - 219. See also Cohen IV at 203.
290. See supra notes 220 - 245. See also Levi at 714.
291. See supra notes 159 - 195. See also Minnesota Note at 1579.
292. See supra section IV.
293. Cohen IV at 203. See supra notes 196 - 219.
294. This is measured by balancing the First Amendment interests of the press and
society against the interests of the source and the state.
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mate interest in redressing wrongful injury. "295 In the context of
the breach of reporter-source confidentiality agreements, and especially in light of the facts of Cohen, this is indeed an understatement. While an approach that quickly, easily, and equitably resolves these tensions would be ideal, such an approach does not
exist. However, given the alternatives, constraints, and goals that
must be met, the First Amendment-sensitive promissory estoppel
approach appears to be the closest to ideal that current jurisprudential sensibilities will allow.
Paul D. Petruzzi*

295. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (citations ommitted).
* A.B., 1990, Hamilton College; J.D., 1993, University of Miami School of Law. Executive Editor, University of Miami Entertainment and Sports Law Review, 1992-1993.
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